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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, telecommunications networks have undergone 
an explosive growth. As a consequence, there has been a strong 
demand of information protection mechanisms. Many 
cryptosystems based on chaos have been proposed, although 
little or no critical analysis has been made about the security 
and cryptographic robustness of these algorithms. In this paper 
we present our tools to examine some of these algorithms from 
a cryptographic perspective, showing many vulnerabilities that 
can be exploited to successfully break them. We conclude that 
most of the chaotic cryptosystems are very insecure and 
cumbersome, thus, unreliable and impractical for real 
applications. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern telecommunications networks, and specially Internet, 
have increased the possibilities of user communications and 
information transmission to limits unimaginable a short time 
ago. There is a parallel growing cryptographic techniques 
demand, which has originated an intense research activity and 
the search of new directions in cryptography.  
As a result, a rich variety of chaotic cryptosystems for end to 
end communications have been put forward, whose robustness 
and privacy are equally diverse [1-9].  
Up to date, little or no critical analysis has been made about the 
security and cryptographic robustness of these algorithms [10-
16]. We have detected that a systematic approach to 
cryptanalysis and security evaluation is missing. To fill this 
void, in this paper we examine some of these algorithms from a 
cryptographic perspective. 
First, in section 2, we propose some new analysis tools based on 
the theory of 1D quadratic maps, such as Gray codes [17], an 
extension of the Myrberg method [18] or the well known 
bifurcation diagrams and histograms. 
Second, in section 3, we make use of these tools to successfully 
attack the proposed cryptosystems. Depending on the cipher 
under study and its parameter configuration, some or all of the 
following attacks prove to be successful, usually with a 
surprisingly low number of texts: ciphertext-only, known-
plaintext, chosen plaintext, and chosen ciphertext. 
After our cryptanalysis, we conclude that most of the chaotic 
cryptosystems are very insecure and, thus, unreliable for critical 
applications. 
 
2. CRYPTANALYSIS TOOLS 
Chaotic cryptosystems, as any other cryptosystem, seek to offer 
three important properties to frustrate cryptanalytic efforts, 
namely [6]: 
i) Be sensitive with respect to keys: flipping one bit in a key 
creates completely different ciphertext when applied to the same 
plaintext. 
ii) Be sensitive with respect to plaintext: flipping one bit in the 
plaintext creates completely different ciphertext. 
iii) Map plaintext to random ciphertext: there should not be any 
patterns in the ciphertext, if the cryptosystem is good. 
These three properties can be easily related to three 
characteristics of chaotic systems, respectively: 
i) Parameter sensitivity: small variation in one of the system 
parameters is enough to make two trajectories, starting at the 
same initial point, separate at exponential rate. 
ii) Initial condition sensitivity: two trajectories starting at two 
different, though arbitrarily close, initial points separate from 
each other exponentially. 
iii) Ergodicity: the trajectories followed by points belonging to 
the phase space travel through the space with uniform 
distribution. 
Although chaotic systems satisfy all these properties, they are 
deterministic in nature after all. As a consequence, it is possible 
to detect patterns in their behaviour, which can be readily used 
by the cryptanalyst to find order within the apparent chaos. 
To serve this purpose, we make use of the following three tools, 
adapted from the well known chaos theory background: Gray 
codes [17], hyperbolic components centres determination using 
our extension of the Myrberg method [18], and bifurcation 
diagrams and histogramas. The field of application of these 
tools is restricted to unimodal maps, with one critical point. 
Gray codes 
A Gray code is a function G(i) of the integers i, that for each 
integer 0≥N  is one-to-one for 120 −≤≤ Ni , and that has the 
following remarkable property: The binary representation of 
G(i) and G(i+1) differ in exactly one bit. 
Let )(xfx cα  be a family of 1-D quadratic maps, of parameter 
c, which transforms an interval I into itself. To represent 
symbolically the dynamics of the orbit followed by an initial 
point x0 for a given parameter value c, we do not record the 
exact value of each iterate, but consider simply if it falls to the 
left (L), to the right (R), or on the critical point (C) of the map. 
Thus, from the orbit x0, x1 = fk(x0), x2 = fk(x1),…, xn = fk(xn–1),… 
one gets a symbolic sequence S = s0s1s2…sn… in one-to-one 
correspondence, where 
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In Fig. 1 we plotted the graph of the real Mandelbrot map, 
cxx nn +=+ 21 ,   with 2−=c . In the low part appears the order 
corresponding to the open intervals on the x-axis when 
considering until three initial symbols. If n initial symbols are 
considered, the points separating the intervals have the property 
that orbits whose initial point corresponds to an interval 
separator are preperiodic. These interval separators, which will 
be denoted as )( 1,1
i
nI + , with 
121 −≤≤ ni , the first subindex being 
the preperiod and the second subindex being the period, are 
calculated as the zeroes of 0)(1 =− xf nc . For example, for three 
initial symbols (n = 3) and 2−=c , the family of interval 
separators )( 1,4
iI  are the four zeroes of 02)2()( 2222 =−−=− xxf , 
namely, 22 +±  and 22 −± . Of course, the previous 
level interval separators 1,2I , 
)1(
1,3I  and 
)2(
1,3I  are still acting as 
separators in between next level separators. Let us note that 
when substituting L’s for 1’s and R’s for 0’s, the sequences are 
ordered in Gray code. 
 
Fig. 1. Symbolic sequences for the real Mandelbrot map with c = –2. 
Hyperbolic components centres 
The c value of the real Mandelbrot map’s parameter originating 
a real superstable orbit of a given symbolic sequence CXX…X 
can be obtained by repeatedly iterating Myrberg’s modified 
formula: 
 nnnn cccc −±±−±−±=+ ...1  (1) 
where the symbol ± stands for a + sign or a – sign according to 
the expression of the orbit’s symbolic dynamics, assigning the + 
sign to the letter R and the – sign to the letter L. 
Bifurcation diagrams and histograms 
A bifurcation diagram represents the position of the fixed points 
of a map as a function of the parameter value, usually showing a 
number of bifurcations. They constitute an invaluable tool for 
the study of 1D maps. 
Another way to obtain information about a map for a given 
parameter value is through its histogram. After dividing up the 
attractor in subintervals, the histogram represents in normalized 
form the relative frequency of visits to each interval when an 
initial point is iterated under a parameter value. 
4. ATTACK METHODS 
In this section we describe how these tools help us to find order 
underlying the apparent randomness in the proposed chaotic 
systems, which is enough to open vulnerabilities for attack. 
Gray codes 
Whenever a cryptographic algorithm uses a unimodal map and a 
succession of iterates to code a binary sequence, according to 
whether they fall to the left (say "1") or to the right (say "0") of 
the critical point, Gray codes turn out to be of great assistance to 
the cryptanalyst. 
As a first example, let us consider the cryptosystem proposed by 
Alvarez et al. [1], based on the tent map: 
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The encryption process can be described in the following way: 
choose a suitable real number r, the parameter of the dynamical 
system (2), as the key of the system. Next, consider the first 
block of information bits to be transmitted, of length b1, and 
start iterating Eq. (2) from an arbitrary initial condition x0. 
Construct a chain C1 of 0's and 1's according to the convention: 
02/1 →≤nx  and 12/1 →>nx . As this chain is being 
generated, keep looking for the repetition in it of the bits of the 
first block b1. When this pattern appears, record the value of 1nx  
at which this pattern began and stop iterating. The vector 
(
1
,1 nxb ) constitutes the ciphertext of the first block of b1 bits of 
the plaintext. The encryption process continues by selecting the 
next new b2-bit length block and iterating from a new arbitrary 
initial value until the same pattern is generated by the orbit of 
the dynamical system (2). The next ciphertext unit would be 
made up by the block length and the value of the iterate at 
which the pattern appeared: (
2
,2 nxb ). This process goes ahead 
until the plaintext is exhausted. The ciphertext units are 
decrypted by iterating bi times the initial condition inx , and 
using the threshold 1/2 to convert the sequence of real numbers 
thus obtained into the correct sequence of bits. 
 
Fig. 2. Graphic of tent map for r = 2.0: upper part, f(x), )(2 xf , and 
)(3 xf ; lower part, first letters of the symbolic sequences followed by 
initial points within the indicated intervals. 
In Fig. 2, we show a representation of the first, second and third 
order iteration of f(x). Below, we represent the first letters of the 
symbolic sequence of the orbit described by any initial point 
within the interval thus delimited. It is easy to observe that the 
leftmost interval for the i-th iteration is delimited by the origin 
and the first peak of )(xf i , whose coordinate can be calculated 
as )2/(1 1−= ip rx . Hence, for 1=i , the interval for which all 
initial points give rise to symbolic sequences of the form L… is 
(0, 1/2); for 2=i , symbolic sequences LL… are originated by 
initial points in (0, 1/(2r)); for 3=i , the interval corresponding 
to symbolic sequences LLL… is (0,1/(2r2)); and so on. As a 
matter of fact, these sequences are ordered according to a Gray 
code. 
The following chosen ciphertext attack finds r, looking for the 
value of the first peak of the b-th iteration of f(x): 
1. Choose a ciphertext (b, x0), with x0 sufficiently close to the 
origin. 
2. Request the decrypted plaintext. 
3. Check the plaintext sequence: if it is made of all 0's, then 
choose a new initial point slightly bigger; if it is all 0's but 
the last bit, then choose a new initial point slightly smaller. 
4. Repeat until the value of xp has been obtained with the 
desired precision and then calculate the parameter value as 
1 )2/(1−= b pxr . 
For instance, as in [1], let the secret key be r = 1.99 and bmax = 
16. To begin with, we try the following ciphertext: (16, 510− ), 
obtaining the sequence 00…0. We try next (16, 5102 −× ), 
obtaining 00…01. Therefore, we know that the correct value 
must lie in between 510−  and 5102 −× . We perform a binary 
search, trying (16, 5105.1 −× ), from which we obtain 00…0. 
Next we try (16, 51075.1 −× ), whose plaintext is 00…01. 
Continuing with this process we reach the exact value of the 
secret key r = 1.99 after having used 18 units of chosen 
ciphertext. As a result from our several tests, we have checked 
that our method of attack successfully retrieves the exact key in 
less than 20 steps.  
Gray codes can be further used to exploit another vulnerability 
in this cryptosystem. When we consider the dynamical system 
(2) when r = 2, there is a uniformity in the lengths of 
subintervals corresponding to a given symbolic sequence (see 
Fig. 2). The set of points having sequence s1s2…sk has length 
k−2 , independent of the sequence. As r departs from 2, the 
length of the subintervals starts varying slightly, but still 
remains close enough to the uniform distribution as to give a 
good hint on the orbit followed by initial points within those 
subintervals. Under these circumstances, the following 
ciphertext-only attack, the most difficult of all, succeeds in 
finding the plaintext by making simple guesses about the 
sequence of symbols originated by those initial points: 
1. Given the first ciphertext unit, (b, x0), divide up the unit 
interval in 2b subintervals of equal length 2–b. 
2. Find in which of these subintervals the initial point x0 is 
located. 
3. The plaintext will be the symbolic sequence associated to 
that interval (see Fig. 2), changing L's into 0's and R's into 
1's. 
4. Proceed with the next ciphertext unit in the same way. 
For instance, considering an 8-bit block size, the initial value 
492690.0
1
=nx  of the first ciphertext unit, lies in the 126-th 
subinterval. Any initial point in this subinterval gives rise to a 
symbolic sequence LRLLLLLR… Simply translating into 
binary code, we get the guess 01000001. Following with this 
process, we construct Table 1, where we have listed the results 
of such guesses for a sequence of 15 ciphertext units. It can be 
seen that almost all the bits are guessed correctly, without any 
knowledge of the secret key! In the example, our method of 
attack is able to recover correctly 117 bits out of 120. The closer 
the value of the secret key r is to 2.0, the better this method 
works. 
Plaintext (binary) Ciphertext Guess (binary) 
C(01000011) 0.492690 A(01000001) 
r(01110010) 0.363853 s(01110011) 
i(01101001) 0.305905 i(01101001) 
p(01110000) 0.374380 p(01110000) 
t(01110100) 0.345842 t(01110100) 
o(01101111) 0.292097 o(01101111) 
l(01101100) 0.285359 m(01101101) 
o(01101111) 0.290362 o(01101111) 
g(01100111) 0.272265 g(01100111) 
y(01111001) 0.318392 y(01111001) 
i(01101001) 0.305906 i(01101001) 
s(01110011) 0.365439 s(01110011) 
t(01110100) 0.345434 t(01110100) 
h(01101000) 0.311260 h(01101000) 
e(01100101) 0.276883 e(01100101) 
Table 1. Message recovered in a ciphertext-only attack. Differences 
appear in bold face. 
As a second example, let us consider the algorithm proposed by 
Habutsu et al. [7]. To encrypt a plaintext P into C, it uses the 
inverse of another version of the tent map: 
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iterating n = 75 times. To resolve the ambiguity of which 
expression to use when going backwards, a random value ri is 
used. This means that for each plaintext there can exist 275 
different ciphertexts. Thus, )(75 PfC −= . However, when 
decrypting the ciphertext C into P, it uses the direct form of the 
map, i.e.: 
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Fig. 3. Graphic of Habutsu's tent map [7] for α = 0.3: f(x), )(2 xf , and 
)(3 xf . 
Hence, )(75 CfP = . It is precisely during the decryption 
process that this algorithm is totally vulnerable to a chosen 
ciphertext attack. In Fig. 3, we show a representation of the 
first, second and third order iteration of f(x). The leftmost 
interval for the i-th iteration is delimited by the origin and the 
first peak of )(xf i , whose coordinate can be calculated as 
i
px α= . Thus, if we choose a ciphertext C sufficiently small, 
then we can obtain the key value as 75 / PC=α . This attack 
recovers the exact key with just one ciphertext! 
As a last example, let us consider Baptista's cryptosystem [4], 
based on the property of ergodicity of chaotic systems, i.e., the 
eventual visit of the trajectory to all partitions in the phase space 
as the number of iterations grows. His cryptosystem exploits 
this property by using the logistic map 
 )1(1 nnn xbxx −=+   (3) 
where )1,0(∈nx  and the parameter b is chosen so that Eq. (3) 
behaves chaotically. 
The message to be transmitted is considered to be coded in a s-
symbol alphabet. The interval (0,1) is thus divided up into s 
sub-intervals of length ε, in a one-to-one association with the s 
symbols. In Fig. 4 we have represented a schematic view of 
how the association between the s ε-intervals and the s symbols 
takes place. Each interval, or site, is in the range [ ]εε sxsx +−+ minmin ,)1( , where s can take any value, v.g. in 
[BAP 98] s = 256. It is clear that sxx /)( minmax −=ε  and [ ]maxmin , xx  is a portion of the attractor or the whole one. 
The ciphertext generated as the number of iterations needed by 
the orbit to land on the interval which corresponds to the given 
plaintext symbol starting from an initial condition x0. To recover 
the original text, Eq. (3) is iterated from x0 as many times as 
indicated by the ciphertext. After this number of iterations is 
reached, the orbit will have landed on an interval which 
corresponds to the plaintext symbol. 
The system key is formed by the possible associations between 
the s intervals and symbols, the value of x0 and the value of the 
parameter b. For every new symbol to be encrypted, a new x0 is 
chosen equal to the value of the last iterate, corresponding to the 
previous symbol. For example, if the symbol s1 is encrypted as 
c1, corresponding to the number of iterations needed to land on 
the interval s1 starting from x0, then the next initial value will be 
)( 00 1 xfx
c=′ , where 1cf  represents the c1-th iteration of Eq. 
(3), and so on. 
 
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of the attractor partitioned in slots of 
size ε and their association with the language of s symbols. 
Let us consider a known plaintext attack, in which we know the 
first pairs of plain and ciphertext of a message and that we know 
the parameter value, which stands for half of the key. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will consider a source S2, emitting only 
two symbols; the attractor defined by the real Mandelbrot map, 
instead of the logistic map; and the interval 
)2,2( maxmin =−= xx , without loss of generality. We set the 
initial point to x0 = 0.232323, to the right of the critical point, 
and c = –1.8. Under these conditions, the number of iterations 
needed to encrypt each symbol equals the number of times that 
the orbit remains to the left or to the right of the critical point. 
Let us agree that s1 corresponds to the left region, while s2 
corresponds to the right region. Therefore, if the plaintext is 
s1s2s2s1s1s1s1…, then the ciphertext (1 1 3 1 1 2 1  …) allows us 
to reconstruct the symbolic sequence of the orbit followed: O = 
RL R LLR L L RL L … Next, we need to narrow the interval 
where the initial value x0 lies in, or equivalently, we have to 
work out the value of the interval separators delimiting the 
interval which corresponds to that symbolic sequence O. If O is 
translated into Gray code, by simply substituting R's by 0's and 
L's by 1's, then we obtain g0 = 01011011011. Next, we add and 
subtract one, still operating in Gray code, obtaining: g1 = 
01011011010 and g–1 = 01011011001. Last, we take the 
common part of g0 and g1 and of g0 and g–1. Substituting 1’s by 
'–' and 0’s by '+' in Eq. (1), we obtain finally: 
g
g
c c c c c c c c c c1
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which evaluated at c = –1.8 leads to a lower and an upper bound 
of x0, (0.2254207616, 0.2434413280). The more pairs of clear 
and ciphertext we have, the greater the precision with which x0 
can be bounded. Continuing with this example, if more than 7 
plain and ciphertext units were known, say 20, the bounding 
interval would be narrowed to (0.23232170,0.23232332). This 
method allows us to drastically decrease the key space for an 
exhaustive key search, from 1016 a 91005.4 × . Obviously, given 
more units of plain and ciphertext, the key space can be further 
reduced. 
Let us consider now a higher order source, S4, emitting four 
different symbols. In this case, both symbols s1 and s2 
correspond to letter L, whereas s3 and s4 correspond to letter R. 
Let us consider a chosen plaintext attack, in which we can 
request the ciphertext of a message consisting of all its units set 
to s1. The number of iterations used to encrypt each symbol 
indicates the number of sites different from s1 that are visited 
before landing on s1. However, we can not assume that this 
simply means an R, because the site corresponding to s2 lies 
also to the left of the critical point. Therefore, we construct a 
sequence of 1’s and 0’s from the ciphertext, where the 1 
represents the symbol s1 and the 0, any other symbol. Next, we 
repeat the process with a chosen plaintext with all units set to s2. 
Another sequence of 1’s and 0’s is thus generated and we XOR 
both sequences. Let us see how this work with an example. 
Again, x0 = 0.232323 y c = –1.8. The result of encrypting the 
plaintext (s1s1s1s1s1s1s1) is (1 3 3 3 2 2 2). Its associated Gray 
sequence is (1001001001010101). When the plaintext 
(s2s2s2s2s2s2s2) is encrypted, we obtain (3 3 3 4 7 6 4), whose 
associated Gray sequence is 
(001001001000100000010000010001). XORing both 
sequences we obtain 101101101101110101… Finally, we add a 
0 at the beginning of the sequence, assuming with 50% 
probability that x0 lies to the right. Taking this sequence as g0, 
we construct g1 and g–1 and from them we can work out a lower 
and an upper bound of x0 as before. In this case, we obtain 
(0.2322592037, 0.2323430867). Once again, the interval where 
x0 lies will be increasingly narrowed as more clear and 
ciphertext units are taken into account.  
This process can be repeated for any other higher order source 
Si. In each case, a chosen plaintext of Si /2 symbols has to be 
used, obtaining similar results. 
Hyperbolic components centres 
Myrberg equation (1) can still be used for another attack on 
Baptista's algorithm. Let us suppose now that we know the 
value of the initial point x0. Under this circumstance, it is 
possible to estimate the value of the parameter and recover the 
complete key from a few pairs of known plain and ciphertexts. 
To begin with, we shall use the S2 source, the initial point 
 0.2323230 =x and c = –1.8. Given a known plain and 
ciphertext pair, say s1s2s2s1s1s1s1…, and  (1 1 3 1 1 2 1  …), 
respectively, we construct the symbolic sequence followed by 
the orbit: O = RL R LLR L L RL L … Next, taking the letters in 
this sequence one by one, we construct a series of discrete 
dynamical systems which will get closer and closer to the 
parameter value which originated the given sequence. For O = 
RL…, we have that  
0xcc =−−−+ ; 20xcc +−=−  
which allows us to construct the dynamical system 
2
01 xcc nn +−=− + . Iterating from c0 = 0, we obtain the fixed 
point c* = –1.105, our first estimate of c. For O = RLR…, we 
have the dynamical system 201 xccc nnn +−+−=− + , which 
converges to the value c* = –1.843. If we continue adding more 
letters to the orbit, we obtain the following succession of 
estimates for c: 1.447, –1.7123, –1.8106, –1.7568, –1.7853, –
1.8039, –1.7928, –1.7981, –1.8022, –1.7996, –1.8008, –1.8001, 
–1.7998, … Hence, with a few pairs of plain and ciphertext 
units we have estimated the parameter value with an error of 
410− . Of course, given more text units, the estimation will be 
better. The application of this method to higher order sources is 
immediate.  
Bifurcation diagrams and histograms 
Although well known in the study of 1D maps, bifurcation 
diagrams and histograms are valuable tools for the cryptanalyst, 
and should be routinely used by the cryptosystem designer too, 
as they can pinpoint weaknesses in an algorithm. 
First, we shall use the bifurcation diagram of the tent map, 
depicted in Fig. 5, to identify a vulnerability in Alvarez's 
algorithm [1]. When moving to the left from r = 2, the interval 
visited by the orbits of Eq. (2) shrinks steadily, getting smaller 
as r decreases. The shape of the curves in Fig. 5 can be 
computed from what we call the critical polynomials of Eq. (2), 
defined as ),(1 nn PrfP =+ . Starting from 2/100 == xP , the tent 
map's critical point, we obtain: 
2/10 =P  
2/1 rP =  
)2/1(2 rrP −=  
… 
 
Fig. 5. Bifurcation diagram of the tent map. The arrows indicate the 
intervals visited by the orbits for different values of the parameter r. 
Thus, the upper bound of the visited interval for any parameter 
value is 2/r , whereas the lower bound is )2/1( rr − . Now we 
have the necessary tools to carry out the following chosen 
plaintext attack which again finds the exact value of the secret 
key r: 
1. Starting with the maximum block size, request 1000 times 
the ciphertext of the word 00…0, of length bmax bits. It will 
be of the form (bi, inx ). In fact, the value of bi will be 
much lower, as r departs from 2.0. 
2. Using the following formula, compute the corresponding 
values of the estimation of r:  
ini xr 211
~ −+=  
The maximum value of all the ir
~ 's thus computed 
corresponds to the exact key.  
Histograms can be further used for a chosen plaintext attack on 
Habutsu's cryptosystem. Simply request 1000 times the 
ciphertext Ci of the same plaintext P. Due to the use of the 
random parameter ri, 1000 different values of Ci will be 
returned. But as depicted in Fig. 6, there is an accumulation of 
points towards the exact value of the parameter. The more 
ciphertexts requested, the more accurate the estimation of α will 
be. For values of the parameter 6.04.0 ≤≤α , this attack 
method fails to give a good estimation of α, being worse as α 
gets closer to 0.5, because the points are more uniformly 
distributed. 
 
Fig. 6. Three histograms of Ci for n = 10000 and 1000-point bins. a) 
1.0=α , b) α = 0.3, and c) α = 0.5. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have experimentally proved in this paper that using 
cryptanalysis tools developed from chaos theory it is possible to 
break different chaotic cryptosystems based on unimodal maps 
iteration.  
Apart from the weaknesses showed by our attack methods, all 
these cryptosystems are computationally heavy. For the 
encryption of a single unit of plaintext, they require times which 
are some orders of magnitude longer than it would take for a 
classical algorithm. 
When using a non linear dynamical system exhibiting 
sensitivity to initial conditions and to parameter mismatch, both 
transmitter and receiver need to use the same machine precision 
if the correct plaintext is to be recovered. This requirement 
implies that, unlike classical cryptographic algorithms, chaos 
based algorithms require machines at both ends to use the same 
compiler, precision, number representation, etc.  If not, after a 
certain number of iterations, the orbits followed by both 
systems (transmitter and receiver), although starting from the 
same initial point and with same parameter value, will diverge 
exponentially (this rate of divergence can be estimated by 
computing the Lyapunov exponent of the system).  
The computational high cost, the machine accuracy problem, 
and the cryptographic weakness, turn down these cryptosystems 
as serious candidates to outstand number theory based classical 
algorithms. At most, they can be regarded as curious 
information concealment methods to frustrate the casual 
eavesdropper, but in no case the determined attacker. In too 
many occasions they are so easily broken and in such a short 
time that no secure application can be found for them. 
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